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How does a nation transform itself from an imitative one to an innovative one? This
is a challenge that most catching-up countries face as they make their way up the
ladder in the world economy. In the twentieth century, however, examples of
countries that successfully made the transition are rare, South Korea being one of the
very few. In this book, the late Linsu Kim analyzes Korea’s experience of rapid
industrialization (1960-1995) and identifies the late 1970s and early 1980s as the
critical turning point at which the Korean nation made the transition from “imitation
to innovation.”
If you are in search of a clear-cut answer as to how the Koreans managed to make
that transition, this is not the book for you. Kim enumerates a long list of “factors”—
“government, chaebols, education, export policy, technology transfer strategy,
research, development policy, sociocultural systems, and private-sector strategy”
( p. 194)—that interact with one another to create a complex dynamics of change.
The author’s intention is to provide a comprehensive overview of how this dynamics
of change played out in three key industries (automobiles, consumer electronics, and
semiconductors), with an additional chapter on small and medium-sized enterprises.
Korea’s technological trajectory, as Kim observes, has been in the reverse
direction compared to that of advanced countries. Scholars in technology studies
have long debated whether technology determines human action. If the tenet of
technological determinism holds anywhere, it is at the catching-up countries
constrained by the technological trajectories set by advanced nations. As particular
technologies go through stages of development in advanced countries—emergence,
consolidation, and maturity—developing nations typically take the opposite route,
beginning with mature technologies and gradually moving onto emerging ones.
(Figure 4-2, p. 89). If this strategy is successful, the catching-up country acquires the
capability to conduct indigenous development and research activities.
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No analysis of a developing country’s technological capability would be complete
without a comment on the role of the government. Indeed, the Korean government
employed an array of policy measures to facilitate the firms’ technological learning,
including promotion of chaebols through subsidies and incentives, export policy,
and technology transfer policy. These measures, according to Kim, were carefully
designed to move the nation’s technological capability along the stages from
technology importation to indigenous R&D. Government intervention does not
account for the whole story, however: as Kim makes it clear, “[t]he government…
provided a policy environment, but it was industry that made it reality” ( p. 21).
The private industry began to eclipse the government circa 1980. If the
government-funded research institutes were at the forefront of advanced technology
during the 1960s and 1970s, industrial R&D took over the role in subsequent
decades. This was a prolonged process of technological learning. Beginning with
acquiring foreign technology through patent licensing and importing capital goods,
firms gradually learned to substitute foreign parts with domestically manufactured
ones, then eventually attained the capability to design the entire system. In order to
accelerate the process, industry leaders periodically constructed “crises” that drove
the workers to meet unrealistic deadlines. The government, for its part, provided the
background—extension of loans, protection against foreign competition, and
suppression of labor—against which the industry could set such audacious goals.
Kim’s interest is in explaining how Korea made the transition from imitation to
innovation (which he accomplishes in rather broad strokes), but not why it happened.
There are some clues, however. His case studies indicate that the urge to acquire
indigenous technological capability arose from very concrete needs, especially when
foreign firms began to refuse sharing their technologies. For example, Mitsubishi,
which provided the core technology to Hyundai Motors, suddenly refused to renew
the contract in the mid-1980s when the Korean automakers successfully penetrated
the North American market with its Excel model ( p. 119). Similarly, LG Electronics
found that “no foreign color TV maker was willing to license to Korean makers to
help them invade the U.S. market” in the mid-1970s ( p. 136). It was only when
these external crises occurred that Korean firms began to consider investing
seriously in indigenous R&D.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that there is no clear-cut line between the
imitative and innovative stages. In fact, one of the purposes of conducting
indigenous R&D was to gain a stronger bargaining position in acquiring foreign
patent licenses, and acquiring foreign technology allowed catching-up firms to build
up internal technological capabilities. In other words, imitation leads to innovation
and vice versa.
Kim’s findings are less than surprising. The three industries at the core of his
analysis largely fall within the parameters of his theoretical construct. Perhaps future
students of Korean technology will benefit from pursuing more specificity. Rather
than trying to generalize, one should try to understand the inner workings of the
complex dynamics from the bottom up. Who were the individuals behind the
decision to invest in indigenous R&D at Samsung in the mid-1970s? Did they truly
believe that building up internal technological capabilities will help them acquire
foreign patents? Was there resistance to this strategy? And if so, how did they
overcome it, and what was the logic they employed to do so? Did this logic reflect
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the broader sense of Korea’s place in the global technological pecking order? These
are no doubt difficult questions to answer, but they are critical to gaining a better
understanding of the transition from imitation to innovation.
For those who wish to take on these challenges, this book provides a useful
heuristic and a starting point. It would be of interest to a broad range of historians
and social scientists aiming to take a closer look at the innovative process in
contemporary South Korea. As a pioneering study of Korean technology, Imitation
to Innovation will stay on the reading list for future students for years to come.
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